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Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
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Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
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monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
Rules can make tax law certain in simple and stable regulatory domains. A theory of how 
to make the law more certain is developed for more complex, dynamic domains. Its first 
step is to define overarching principles and make them binding on taxpayers. One of those 
overarching principles would be a general anti-avoidance principle.  
 
Next, a set of rules to cover the complex area of tax law is defined. The legislature lays 
down that in a contest between a rule and an overarching principle, it will not be the rule 
that is binding. That is, the principle is not merely used to assist in interpreting the rule. 
Rather it is the principle that is binding with the rules used to assist in applying the 
principle. Specific sets of rules for the most commonly used types of transactions or 
business arrangements are also written. This might involve a dozen different sets of rules 
to regulate concrete arrangements. Such rules actually merely specify examples of how the 
principles apply. Each of the dozen sets of illustrative rules are followed with an 
explanation that the reason for the rules being this way in this concrete situation is to 
honour the overarching principles. This is a way for the legislature to make it clear to 
judges that it is the principles that are the binding feature of the law. The paper also 
discusses what to do when judges do not respect this, reverting to old habits of privileging 
rules. It also discusses how to nurture shared sensibilities around the principles among 
judges, practitioners and the community.  
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Making tax law more certain: A theory 
John Braithwaite1 
 
The Problem 
 
An interesting feature of the contemporary private law of contract is that it is regulated by 
certain principles many of which are imported from the public law of consumer protection 
(Collins, 1999). The literal language of a contract can be overridden if it is unconscionable: 
if an immigrant who could not read the language were told simply that local custom 
required her signature here. Or the duty of good faith can be used to require each party to 
act consistently with the real purpose of a contract even if the written detail of the contract 
appears to offer one of the parties an escape from that purpose. Unconscionability and 
good faith are bigger principles in the law than the more detailed rules of contract. They 
are examples of far-reaching principles that connect the different doctrines and rules of 
contract. We see the same approach with traffic rules. The speed limit does give us a bright 
line rule. But keeping under the limit will not protect us if we drive too fast in unusually 
dangerous conditions, like fog. There is no safe harbour in this law; meeting the bright line 
standard does not shelter us from prosecution for excessive speed; it only tells us how to 
keep out of trouble with the law in normal circumstances. Moreover, road safety 
authorities put a lot of effort into educating us of the need to honour the underlying 
principle of cautious driving that is watchful for special hazards. That principle trumps the 
foot-fault rule that the law also gives us to guide our driving.  
 
My argument in this article is that tax law needs this basic approach of combining rules 
and principles more than other areas of law. What most common law nations have tended 
to do instead with complex domains of business law is endure a see-sawing historical 
contest between advocates of the view that a rule of law means a rule of rules on one side, 
and on the other, attempts at grand simplifying projects to shift to a rule of principles. The 
rule of rules is more often in the ascendancy in this contest and grand reform projects such 
                                                 
1 Much of this essay was developed while I was the Meyer Visiting Research Professor at New York 
University Law School. My thanks to Reuven Avi-Yonah, Joseph Bankman, Bob Baxt, Julia Black, Valerie 
Braithwaite, Michael D’Ascenzo, Peter Drahos, Judith Freedman, Rick Krever, Bevan Murphy, Kristina 
Murphy, Fred Schauer, Andrew Stout, Ernst Willheim, Rob Williams and Leslie Zines for conversations that 
helped in refining the essay. 
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as the latest in Australia – the Ralph review (Ralph, 1998) – fail to catalyse fundamental 
change toward a more principle-driven law. Simplifying projects are commenced without 
being completed. Or overarching principles are added to the law without repealing any of 
the thicket of rules that necessitate the principles. So the simplification project of adding 
principles actually renders tax codes longer and more complex. By see-sawing back and 
forth between the rule of rules and the rule of principles we can and usually do end up with 
the worst of both worlds. Instead, our objective might be to get the right kind of integration 
between rules and principles that we get in the less challenging domain of traffic law.2  
 
The debate on the difference between rules and principles, or rules and standards as the 
Americans prefer, is a philosophically abstruse debate that practitioners tend not to find 
very illuminating. Without defending this choice, I simply define principles in the way 
chosen by Joseph Raz: ‘Rules prescribe relatively specific acts; principles prescribe highly 
unspecific actions’ (Raz, 1972, p. 823). Safe driving in light of road conditions is a 
principle; a proscription of speed over 80 kilometres per hour is a rule. If you do not like 
this way of defining the distinction, you can just as happily interpret my argument as one 
about how to integrate general and specific rules. 
 
The Theory Summarised 
 
The argument will be that the best way to integrate rules and principles in complex areas of 
tax law is: 
 
1. Define the overarching principles and make them binding on taxpayers. 
2. Make one of those overarching principles a general anti-avoidance principle 
(perversely normally referred to as a GAAR, a General Anti-Avoidance Rule which 
states that schemes are illegal when their dominant purpose is a tax advantage rather 
than a business purpose, even if the scheme ‘works’ as a shelter from detailed tax 
rules). 
3. Define a set of rules to cover the complex area of tax law.  
                                                 
2 A not dissimilar aspiration is articulated in Michael D’Ascenzo’s hope that tax law ‘will be written in a way 
that exposes the underlying principles’ (D’Ascenzo, 2000).  
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4. The legislature lays down, perhaps through an Acts Interpretation Act,3 that in a contest 
between a rule and an overarching principle, it will not be the rule that is binding. That 
is, the principle is not merely used to assist in interpreting the rule. Rather it is the 
principle that is binding with the rules used to assist in applying the principle (just as in 
the speed and safe driving conditions example). 
5. In a complex field of tax, write specific sets of rules for the most commonly used types 
of transactions or business arrangements. This might involve a dozen different sets of 
rules to regulate concrete arrangements. Such rules actually merely specify examples of 
how the principles apply. 
6. Follow each of the dozen sets of illustrative rules with the explanation that the reason 
for the rules being this way in this concrete situation is to honour the overarching 
principles. This is a way for the legislature to make it clear to judges that it is the 
principles that are the binding feature of the law. Hence when a legal entrepreneur 
reengineers concrete financial product number 11 as an 11A, or corporate structure 
number 9 as a 9A, to get around the law, judges must go back to the principles to 
decide what to do.  
7. When judges fail to do this, reverting to old habits of privileging rules, enact a simple 
statute that says the 11A shelter violates named principles in the tax law and should be 
disallowed in future. Its effect is simply to strike down the court’s precedent in the 11A 
case and to engage the judiciary in a conversation with the legislature on the clarity of 
its intention to have a principle-driven tax law.4  
8. Foster educative dialogue with judges, company directors and the community about the 
principles in the tax law in the hope that conversations among judges and tax 
practitioners, around the Boardroom table and around the table of dinner parties will 
develop shared sensibilities on what those principles mean. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Other elements of the legislative history of specific statutes can also be mobilized to this end (for example, 
explanatory memoranda and second reading speeches in the Australian parliamentary context).  
4 I am indebted to a conversations with Daniel Shaviro and Ernst Willheim for this thought. 
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The Theory Justified 
 
In a more general paper on why binding principles backed by non-binding rules generate 
more certainty in complex areas of law than the reverse, I have provided a more detailed 
justification for the above propositions (Braithwaite, 2002). All I mean by the principles 
being binding and the rules non-binding is that in a conflict between a principle and a rule 
that is derived from it, the presumption is in favour of following the principle. I will merely 
summarise the key arguments in the more general paper here. The paper argues firstly that 
with simple, stable phenomena that rarely involve large economic stakes (conditions that 
do not generally apply to tax), rules deliver satisfactory consistency in legal decision 
making. It is only in domains that are complex, dynamic, and where litigants may find the 
economic stakes high enough to invest in legal advice to see if there is a way around the 
law, that precise rules fail to deliver consistency on their own. Why?5  
 
H. L. A. Hart pointed out that rules have a core meaning and a penumbra where their 
meaning is more uncertain (Hart, 1961). The more complex and changing the phenomenon 
being regulated, the wider that penumbra is likely to be. A factor that drives much 
uncertainty is that wealthy legal game players aim for the penumbra, play the game in 
ways that expand the grey area of the law. Flux is particularly important here. The 
penumbra of simple rules that regulate stable phenomena is small. It does exist as in Lon 
Fuller’s example of a statue of a truck in a park where vehicles are prohibited (Fuller, 
1958). The unforeseen rare event of the failure to encompass the truck statue in the rule 
will never cause great problems in regulating the static phenomenon of parks. But in 
dynamic domains like tax, uncommon things like concrete trucks can be rendered common 
by game playing investors seeking a tax advantage.6  
 
The penumbra problem is not the only game playing threat. Rules look more certain when 
they stand alone; uncertainty is created in the juxtaposition with other rules. With simple 
rules that regulate simple phenomena it is easy to draft them so there is no conflict between 
a rule that says A is proscribed and another that X is specifically allowable. The conflict 
                                                 
5 The text of the next four pages with permission of the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy draws heavily 
on Braithwaite (2002). 
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arises when A and X are both correct descriptions of an action.7 In complex terrain, 
however, economic and technological change can suddenly create new conflicts of this 
sort. It can be hard for the state to see this coming when there are well paid legal 
entrepreneurs on the lookout for opportunities to expand the penumbra of one rule to 
slightly overlap the penumbra of another, creating compliant non-compliance (McBarnet & 
Whelan, 1999). Indeed with tax, the discovery of such an overlap can be widely used for 
years without the state being aware of this. A firm can commit what the state would 
assume to be a breach of a criminal law or conduct that would attract a civil penalty secure 
in the knowledge that in the unlikely event of the well-concealed conduct being detected 
the company has a letter from a respected lawyer arguing that the conduct is legal by virtue 
of such an overlap. A court may find the lawyer’s argument to be wrong, but so long as it 
is a ‘reasonably argued position’8 the letter advancing it may absolve the company of 
liability for any penalty. This impunity, combined with the huge benefits that can be 
secured, motivates wealthy taxpayers in some cases to spend tens of millions of dollars on 
professional advice to such ends9. Moreover, legal game playing is not an activity of a 
small minority of the big players. An investment banker may not have been too wide of the 
mark in the late 1990s when he said to Joseph Bankman, ‘There isn’t a Fortune 500 
Company that doesn’t invest in these deals [the US market in corporate tax shelters]’ 
(Bankman, 1999).10 
 
This problem multiplies as the state enacts more and more rules to plug loopholes opened 
up by legal entrepreneurs. The thicket of rules we end up with becomes a set of sign-posts 
that show the entrepreneur precisely what they have to steer around to defeat the purposes 
                                                                                                                                                    
6 ‘Uncommon transactions that are taxed inappropriately become common as taxpayers discover how to take 
advantage of them’ (Weisbach, 1999, p. 869).  
7 See McBarnet and Whelan’s (1999) account of the use of ‘ex-files’, express exemptions, in British 
accounting standards.  
8 In the US, the test to secure such immunity is a ‘more-likely-than-not opinion’ (see Bankman, 1999). 
9 In the ASA case transaction costs were estimated at $US24.8 million, 27% of the reported tax savings of 
$US93.5 million. In cases of this ilk, the IRS has observed tax professionals to offer a choice of fees, either 
up-front payment of 25% of taxes paid or a contingent fee of 50% of taxes paid. PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
has been known to ask wealthy clients for a contingency fee of between eight and thirty percent of their tax 
savings. Deloitte and Touche have been revealed to be charging companies a contingency fee of 30% of taxes 
saved for achieving a total wipeout of US state and federal taxes. See Department of the Treasury (1999); 
Novack and Saunders (1998). 
10 Bankman claims that Bear and Sterns & Co. generated over $100 million in fees for advice on lease-strip 
shelters in a matter of months.  
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of the law. Broad prescriptions against a phenomenon like insider trading can engender 
more certainty than a patchwork of specific rules that define A, B, C, D, E and F all as 
forms of insider trading. The rulish form of such an insider trading statute nurtures the 
plausibility of a legal argument that another form of insider trading - G - must be legal 
because the clear intent of the legislature was only to proscribe A to F, when in fact the 
legislature had never thought of G. Legal uncertainty arises from the fact that a thicket of 
rules engenders an argument of a form that some judges will buy and others will not. This 
produces one kind of very strong predictability in the law. If you know which judges you 
will and will not get, you can predict the outcome of your case with a high degree of 
certainty. In a multiple discriminant analysis of House of Lords decisions, over 90 per cent 
of tax and criminal cases could be correctly predicted (in terms of whether the state or the 
other party – the taxpayer, the defendant – won) and more than 80 per cent of public, 
constitutional and civil cases could be correctly predicted in advance by knowing just one 
fact about that case (Robertson, 1998). That fact was which judges would sit on the case. 
Unless they can manoeuvre to select their own judge, this kind of predictability is not 
much use to citizens in pre-litigation decisions as to whether to back one view or another 
of what the law means.  
 
A smorgasbord of rules engenders a cat and mouse legal drafting culture - of loophole 
closing and reopening by creative compliance (McBarnet & Whelan, 1999, p. 28). As the 
law grows in this loophole closing game, the ‘interaction costs’ of drafting new rules to 
ensure that the various provisions work together expand. Once started, the process causes 
law to grow exponentially because ‘the number of interactions is approximately 
proportional to the square of the number of rules’ (Weisbach, 1999, p. 871). If n rules 
exist, a new rule interacts with n prior rules, the next rule with n+1, and so on. Moreover, 
loophole-closing cat and mouse engenders a structurally inegalitarian form of uncertainty. 
The law thus engendered becomes so complex that little people who cannot afford 
sophisticated legal advice do not understand it. In practice a particular law may be certain 
in the way lawyers apply it to ordinary people, but perceptually its complexity makes it 
uncertain to them as a guide to their actions, untutored as they are by legal advice. The 
rich, in contrast, deploy legal entrepreneurship to make the law uncertain in practice. As 
citizens go about activities like paying taxes, creative compliance creates a law that is 
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perceptually unclear to ordinary people, and therefore uncertain for them, and uncertain in 
practice for the rich who more clearly perceive and exploit this uncertainty.  
 
Again we must remember that this structural fact of a formal lawyering of rules is not true 
of simple regulatory domains. There is no important sense in which traffic rules in a legal 
system are more incomprehensible to the poor than the rich, or that they work in a way that 
enables the rich to make them more legally uncertain in practice in their application to the 
driving of the rich. The rich may be more able to bribe police and Magistrates in traffic 
cases, but this is not a matter of uncertainty in what the law says. 
 
One result of a protracted dynamic of rules multiplying exponentially is that no one can 
keep them in their head. Ordinary people certainly cannot have conversations that make 
any sense about much of tax law. Even the most expert tax lawyers increasingly limit their 
expertise to particular domains and, for much of the law, cannot conduct a coherent 
conversation without being able to pull a volume of the law off their shelf and pore over it 
to prepare for the conversation. In my research group’s comparison of nursing home 
regulation in Australia (which involved 31 broad and vague principles/standards) 
compared with US regulation (with over a thousand more precise rules), it was the vague 
Australian principles that were subject to more consistent adjudication – measured by 
having two inspection teams rate compliance of the same homes independently at the same 
points in time (Braithwaite et al., 1991; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 1995). The main 
conclusion of that research was that superior regulatory conversations – among regulators, 
among nursing home staff and between regulators and staff – was possible under a rule of a 
few principles than under a rule of many rules. These empirical findings motivated the 
centrality of Julia Black’s (1998) idea of regulatory conversations in the shared 
sensibilities part of the theory above (point 8). Rules can be very important in fostering 
conversations that lead to shared sensibilities about the law’s requirements, but only if they 
are limited in number and are interrelated in ways that are not incomprehensibly intricate.  
 
Legal entrepreneurship when economic stakes are high does not work simply by exploiting 
change and complexity that is inherent in post-industrial societies. It also works by 
contriving change and complexity. When the Australian government privatised Qantas on 
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terms it thought were generous for the new shareholders, it wanted only Australian citizens 
who had funded Qantas over the years through their taxes to gain the benefit. The 
Macquarie Bank responded by creating a new financial product called a QanMac to get 
around this rule; foreign QanMac owners secured identical functional economic benefits to 
Australian owners of Qantas shares. Financial engineering to create new products that have 
never been conceived by the law is a growing phenomenon of particular importance to 
corporations law and tax compliance at the big end of town. ‘The same minds that figured 
out how to split a security into a multitude of different cash flows and contingent returns 
are now engineering products in which the tax benefits are split off from the underlying 
economics of a deal’ (Novack & Saunders, 1998). Financial engineering is just a newer 
modality of a more longstanding tradition of contrived complexity. Multinational 
corporations have long exploited their capacities to contrive complexity in their books, 
organisational complexity and jurisdictional complexity in order to escape liability even 
for comparatively simple criminal laws such as those against bribery (Braithwaite, 1984).  
 
Complexity in the books is used to enable the laundering of slush funds and deployment of 
a network of subsidiaries to contrive off balance sheet financing. Jurisdictional complexity 
can be exploited, for example, to shift losses to the jurisdiction where they will deliver 
maximum tax deductions and profits to jurisdictions where gains are untaxed. 
Organisational complexity can take the form of the appointment of a ‘Vice-President 
Responsible for Going to Jail’ to ensure there will be no corporate or CEO criminal 
liability, or more commonly it takes the form of a smokescreen of diffused accountability, 
where everyone can credibly blame someone else: there seem to be little bits of blame in 
many places without the possibility of aggregating this to a pattern that satisfies the rules 
of criminal responsibility (Braithwaite, 1984). Poor criminal defendants cannot contrive 
this kind of complexity into their affairs, which is why most inmates of our prisons are 
poor even though the evidence is clear that it is the rich who commit the criminal offences 
that cause greatest loss of property and injury to persons (see Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990). 
With respect to criminal law, this hardly plays out as a major source of uncertainty: a 
detected serious criminal offender of limited means is fairly certain to be convicted; major 
corporate criminals are almost certain never to be convicted partly because they are less 
likely to be detected and partly because of entrepreneurship in excuses and contrived 
 9
complexity. Put another way, there is uncertainty that is structurally predictable by features 
of power in society rather than by features of the law.  
 
Frederick Shauer argues: ‘In many cases, indeed in most cases, the result indicated by 
applying a rule will be the same as the result indicated by directly applying the rule’s 
background justifications …’ (Schauer, 1991, p. 100). What I am arguing is that this is true 
of the law of fraud applied to welfare cheats, false for the law of fraud applied to top 
management of large corporations. As we criminologists put it, the best way to rob a bank 
is to own it. 
 
Is There a Solution? 
  
When a tax authority targets a shelter used by a wealthy individual or corporation it can go 
after it first under specific rules in the law and if that fails the tax authority can attack it 
under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR).11 Many tax experts I have interviewed in 
the course of my research think the GAAR something of an irrelevance because in 
jurisdictions that have it the courts rarely apply it, perhaps because they think it opens the 
door to giving too much discretion to the tax authority.12 If that is so, the implication of the 
argument in this paper, if it is right, is that we need to persuade such courts that the reality 
is the opposite of their intuitions – a rule of rules that closes the judicial door on a GAAR 
actually reduces certainty and increases administrative discretion.13 But it may be that for 
this to be true, judicial conversations need to be open to sharing the sensibilities of 
                                                 
11 At least this is the case under Australian law and administration. Nations with a GAAR include Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong and New Zealand in the common law world and a variety of civil law jurisdictions 
including Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (see Cooper, 2001).  
12 I am particularly grateful for a discussion with Reuven Avi-Yonah on this question. The empirical 
observation that the GAAR is rarely used to decide cases in the courts in Australia and Canada is accurate, 
but it may not be correct that the reason for this is the courts fearing to give too much discretion to tax 
authorities. It may also be that the GAAR effectively deters schemes pre-litigation (see Cooper, 2001,          
p. 127). Rick Krever in commenting upon the ideas in this paper made the point that GAARs are only used in 
practice ‘to deal with tax expenditures, not tax measures’. On this view, what is needed is not a GAAR, but a 
remedy to the problem of politicians wanting to introduce tax expenditures ‘without specifically spelling out 
who the intended beneficiaries are because it would be politically dangerous to explicitly identify the 
intended beneficiary group’.  
13 An additional reason for this with tax is that when one nation treats a particular kind of transaction more in 
terms of form and another state more in terms of substance, global firms can arbitrage substance and form by 
structuring transactions so that a part that gets a benefit under a form conception is located in the state that 
privileges form and another part that does better under a substance conception is channelled to a state that so 
treats it.  
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regulatory conversations between regulators and regulatees.14 Indeed in some way that 
does not threaten the separation of powers and judicial independence, judges need to 
become part of those conversations - Lord Mansfield’s project with making English 
commercial law relevant to the needs of merchants two centuries ago. To the extent that 
judiciaries prove incapable of this, then the case is strengthened for specialised courts such 
as the US Tax Court.  
 
Australia’s GAAR, Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936), depends on 
showing that there exists a scheme, that there is a tax benefit in relation to it, and that a 
person who put the scheme in place did so for the purpose of securing that tax benefit. Tax 
Office Second Commissioner Michael D’Ascenzo has argued that ‘the High Court 
decisions in Peabody15, Spotless16 and Consolidated Press17 provide ‘important and 
consistent statements of principles’ which can help guide the weighing up of tax and non-
tax purposes’ (D’Ascenzo, 2002). These principles are distinctively Australian. Australian 
courts have rejected the ‘Ramsay principle’ developed by the UK courts18 and have 
distanced themselves from US doctrines such as ‘substance over form’ and the ‘step 
transaction’ doctrine.19 Section 177D(b) defines eight factors as in effect badges of 
avoidance. ‘These provide ‘warning lights’ about the possible application of Part IVA.   
For example, a round robin [one of the eight factors in section 177D] may well be legally 
effective to record a loan and a repayment, but it may well assist in drawing the tax 
avoidance conclusion’ (D’Ascenzo, 2002). Transactions that are not objectionable by 
themselves may constitute avoidance in combination. Consistent with the approach 
advocated in this article, the Full Federal Court in Consolidated Press stated in relation to 
section 177D: 
 
                                                 
14 From my conversations with elite tax lawyers, there would be a lot of agreement with the following claim 
by David Weisbach (1999), but not universal agreement: ‘I believe David Halperin’s [1995] claim that tax 
lawyers are sufficiently trained and share a sufficiently common understanding of the tax law to be able to 
determine which transactions anti-abuse rules target and which they do not.’  
15 FC of T v. Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359.  
16 FC of T v. Spotless Services Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 404.  
17 FC of T v. Consolidated Press Holdings (2001) ATC 4343.  
18 John v. FC of T (1989) 166 CLR 417.  
19 ANZ Savings Bank Limited v. FC of T (1993) ATC 4370. 
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The section requires the decision-maker, be it the Commissioner of the Court, to 
have regard to each of these matters. It does not require that they be unbundled 
from a global consideration of purpose and slavishly ticked off. The relevant 
dominant purpose may be so apparent on the evidence taken as a whole that 
consideration of the statutory factors can be collapsed into a global assessment of 
purpose. 20 
 
As a result of High Court decisions such as Peabody and Spotless combined with the 
clarification of the Tax Office’s position in Public Rulings such as TR 2000/8 (investment 
schemes), TR 98/22 (linked or split loan facilities) and TR 95/30 (sale and leaseback) and 
the publication of the Tax Office’s administrative approach in a variety of other ways, 
Second Commissioner Michael D’Ascenzo concludes: ‘These reference points arguably 
provide a more certain basis than is available in other jurisdictions as to when the General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) is likely to be applied, or, in jurisdictions which do not have 
a GAAR, as to when the courts will intervene on the basis of judicial doctrines that have 
been developed in those jurisdictions to counter tax avoidance’ (D’Ascenzo, 2001). 
External tax law consultants are routinely involved on the Tax Office’s Part IVA Panel as 
part of its strategy to cultivate consistently shared sensibilities on what passes the ‘smell 
test’ and what does not. The possibility that shared sensibilities have been cultivated in the 
dialogue between the courts and the Tax Office is suggested by the Tax Office’s claim in 
relation to its aggressive tax planning litigation in 2001 that 13 cases had been finalised on 
‘8 procedural issues – all favourable to the Commissioner’ and ‘5 substantive issues – all 
favourable to the Commissioner’ (Australian Taxation Office, 2001).  
 
Tax laws can be written by setting down binding principles, of which one is the GAAR, 
then detailed rules to illustrate how the principles should be applied to common concrete 
commercial arrangements (see generally Jones, 1996). If there are 1000 rare ways of 
setting up the kinds of arrangements covered by the law, but only a dozen are used with 
any frequency, then these are the 12 concrete arrangements that should be fleshed out into 
                                                 
20 FC of T v. Consolidated Press Holdings (No1) (1999) 99 ATC 4945 at 4971.  
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rules.21 Rules are used to define a dozen mainstream examples of how the principle 
applies. This means business is not left to flounder making sense of how to apply broad 
principles in their normal operations22 and are warned to be wary of tax advisers who 
counsel that the principles are so vague that a legal case can be made to justify almost 
anything in terms of them. At the end of the concrete rule specifications, the law explains 
that these rules are defined in this way because they instantiate named principles. This is a 
further safeguard against lawyerly tendencies to privilege rules that can then be gamed. 
Another is an Acts Interpretation Act, such as those revised in New Zealand and Australia 
to complement their GAARs, that require courts to give effect to purposes of Acts23 or 
more specifically that defend the ‘the integrity of the tax system’.24 In spite of all of this, 
courts are still likely at times to indulge their proclivity to privilege the rules over the 
principles in the law, say in response to a taxpayer whose advisers game one of the sets of 
rules that cover a concrete financial product or form of corporate structuring (9) into a 
minor variation (9A) that shelters income. Even then, there is an alternative to writing new 
rules to plug the loophole. It is for the legislature to enact a simple law that says the 9A 
shelter violates specified principles in the tax law and should in future be disallowed, 
striking down the precedent. The simplest drafting device for doing this is for the new 
statute to state that the 9A shelter comes within the scope of Section X under the old 
statute. This not only strikes down the judicial precedent in the 9A case, it also widens the 
scope of the old statute by making a legislative intent clear to apply the offended principle 
in the law to a wider range of structurings than the judiciary understood.  
 
While the strategy of attacking a shelter first in terms of rules and then in terms of a GAAR 
when this fails may have more general relevance beyond tax law, it is not likely to be 
                                                 
21 Writing rules to cover the other 988 is precisely the drafting error we wish to avoid. Or, more precisely, we 
wish to avoid having to foresee them all and to avoid making the law iteratively more complex to cover them 
as they are used one after the other to game the law.  
22 Another way to decide which arrangements should be defined by illustrative sets of rules would be to apply 
Louis Kaplow’s theory of when law should regulate through rules versus standards (principles in my/Raz’s 
usage). Simplifying, Kaplow (1992) contends that because rules have higher promulgation costs in deciding 
how to craft them ex ante, rules should only be written when the law will be applied frequently. Standards 
have lower promulgation costs than rules but higher application costs (costs in determining how they should 
apply to specific situations). Hence, standards are more economically efficient in application to arrangements 
that arise only rarely. 
23 Sections 15AA and 15AB Acts Interpretation Act, 1901 (Aust.). 
24 Section 6-6B New Zealand Tax Administration Act, 1994.  
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appropriate for conduct where the community wishes to criminalise and imprison 
offenders. Where imprisonment is at risk people are entitled to know with some precision, 
and in advance, what puts them at risk of losing their liberty. In saying this, however, we 
have seen that we cannot assume that precise rules actually do protect us against arbitrary 
exercises of the most frightening state power when the economic phenomena at issue are 
complex25. Fortunately, the criminal law is only occasionally the instrument the regulator 
who wishes to be effective in these areas wants to use. So the prescription here would be 
never to deprive a person of their liberty in circumstances where there is conflict between 
what is commended by a precise rule a citizen has relied upon and what is commended by 
the principle that justifies that rule.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One article that has influenced me greatly in this essay is David Weisbach’s ‘Formalism in 
Tax Law’: ‘Rules must specify the treatment of a greater number of transactions than 
standards [principles] and, therefore, they are systematically more complex than standards’ 
(Weisbach, 1999, p. 867). This is because, according to Weisbach, ‘rules can less afford to 
overlook uncommon transactions than can standards’ (Weisbach, 1999, p. 867). While the 
argument here and in my more general treatment of this topic has been that this is right, it 
is also contended that tax law can list rules for transactions that are common, leaving 
judicial enforcement of the principles and the GAAR to mop up when unusual transactions 
are in contest. This hybrid of rules-principles would actually put the brakes on 
economically wasteful legal entrepreneurship to manipulate the rules. It is a strategy for 
reaping the benefits of rules - clear guidance to taxpayers in common situations - while 
limiting their pathologies: exponential growth in legal complexity, burgeoning compliance 
costs, expanding waste of private and public resources on legal game playing and 
countering it, a tax system that ordinary people cannot comprehend and therefore has low 
legitimacy and hence reduced prospects of voluntary compliance.  
 
                                                 
25 Charles Black (1986) writes: ‘Some lawyers talk as though they thought maximum clarity always desirable 
even though they wouldn’t have to probe very deeply to find that fraud, and fiduciary obligation, and undue 
influence, have been carefully isolated from exact definition …’  
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The solution proposed here could never be a panacea, even if the theory that underpins it is 
right. It may be just one of many things that are needed for a high integrity tax system. 
While simple in its conception, implementation of this approach is necessarily difficult 
when what is being responded to is complexity and flux. Selecting the right examples of 
arrangements that are specified as covered by the principle, and getting the examples right 
in how they are described, is no easy matter. Just as rule writers hopelessly clutter and 
complexify the law by seeking to cover all contingencies, implementers of the theory in 
this article could easily make the mistake of cluttering the statute ‘with descriptions of 
things that never happen’.26  
 
The current tax systems of common law nations are a major cause of growing, and perhaps 
justifiable, citizen distrust in their governments. Good tax administration involves virtuous 
circles of trust begetting trust instead of vicious circles of distrust begetting distrust. There 
are a number of obstacles to flipping the vicious circle into the virtuous circles that our 
RegNet research group27 has documented to exist in other domains of regulation – such as 
Australian nursing home regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Braithwaite, 1994). 
It is not the objective of this article to catalogue all of these obstacles to social capital 
formation and economic growth through a high integrity tax system. It has been just to 
argue that one of them is certainly a pathological tax law that makes the mistake of 
supposing that a rule of law is best accomplished by a rule of just rules.  
  
                                                 
26 I am grateful to the Australian Taxation Office’s Chief Tax Counsel, Michael D’Ascenzo, for this point 
and the words in quotes.  
27 http://regnet.anu.edu.au 
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